The foundations of conscientious objection: against freedom and autonomy

According to the common view, conscientious objection is grounded in autonomy or in ‘freedom of conscience’ and is tolerated out of respect for the objector's autonomy. Emphasising freedom of conscience or autonomy as a central concept within the issue of conscientious objection implies that the conscientious objector should have an independent choice among alternative beliefs, positions or values. In this paper it is argued that: (a) it is not true that the typical conscientious objector has such a choice when they decide to act upon their conscience and (b) it is not true that the typical conscientious objector exercises autonomy when developing or acquiring their conscience. Therefore, with regard to tolerating conscientious objection, we should apply the concept of autonomy with caution, as tolerating conscientious objection does not reflect respect for the conscientious objector’s right to choose but rather acknowledges their lack of real ability to choose their conscience and to refrain from acting upon their conscience. This has both normative and analytical implications for the treatment of conscientious objectors

Why there should not be a General Election ‘about the EU’ – and why the UK isn’t a democracy

There has been much talk about whether a general election will or should take place before 2020, the key arguments behind it being that Theresa May has no mandate to carry out her programme, while also having no mandate to negotiate the exact terms of Brexit. Calling an early election would therefore be a single-topic vote. Yossi Nehushtan argues that such an outcome would be anti-democratic

Why there should not be another snap general (Brexit) election

Having a general election in 2018 is an exceptionally bad way of solving the Brexit problem, argues Yossi Nehushtan. Not only is it anti-democratic to have an election about a single topic but the result will not reflect the majority will because the first past the post system never does

‘This is not the People’s Government or the Democratic Will of the People’

Despite the rhetoric from the Prime Minister’s office following the 2019 UK General Election, the appointed Government has no democratic legitimacy generally, especially regarding the decisions to leave the EU without having a second referendum and to make far-reaching changes to the UK constitution. This poses questions as to the validity of western democracy, particularly in the UK and USA

The Non-Identical Twins in UK Public Law: Reasonableness and Proportionality

Ever since the Wednesbury decision in 1947 UK courts and UK public law scholars have been struggling to comprehend the meaning of ‘reasonableness’ and its relation to ‘proportionality’. The main purpose of this article is to promote conceptual clarity in UK public law by describing the nature of reasonableness and proportionality as grounds of judicial review and by highlighting the overlooked similarities and differences between them. The main arguments of this article are that (1) reasonableness is in its essence a balancing and weighing test; (2) proportionality adds very little to already existing grounds of judicial review in UK public law; (3) this addition is not necessarily focused on the administrative weighing and balancing process; and (4) since proportionality adds very little to already existing grounds of judicial review, no conceptual or normative reason prevents having proportionality as a general ground of judicial review in UK public law